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INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Union (EU) boasts one of the world’s most liberal foreign direct 
investment (FDI) regimes (OECD 2007). EU member States are hosts to MNEs in most 
sectors, from virtually every corner of the globe, and many of the new FDI players from 
emerging markets opt for the EU as host. In the context of increased FDI flows from 
2004, peaking at an historic US$1.9 billion in 2007, the EU - like most countries - was 
rightly criticized for increasing the implementation of restrictive policies and practices 
with an aim to limit inward FDI (IFDI) as and when governments thought barriers 
necessary or desirable (UNCTAD 2008). The EU has been criticized by various 
business executives from emerging markets for raising protectionist barriers to their 
firms, including Gazprom (Traynor 2007) and Mittal (as chronicled by Bouquet 2008). 
The financial crisis and economic recession triggered by the collapse of the sub-prime 
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market in the United States (U.S.) since 2007, changed the international context for FDI 
policy significantly. UNCTAD (2009) estimated that IFDI and cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As) to the EU will decline by around one-third in 2008: this 
represents the largest decline in any part of the world. Even larger declines are predicted 
for 2009. Governments in the EU are divided over needing short-term capital 
investment to guarantee jobs and economic growth, and the requirement that they 
satisfy medium- to long-term political and economic concerns, which fuelled the rise of 
FDI restrictions in the first place. These concerns could escalate if the temptation 
toward protectionism is not firmly resisted.  
 
In order to understand the dynamics of the international investment climate in the EU, 
particularly from the perspective of emerging markets, three levels of analysis are 
required. First, individual member States’ behavior must be examined, since it lies with 
national governments to establish FDI policy, satisfy political economy demands and 
protect welfare at the national level. Second, European authorities, principally the 
European Commission, require analysis as the main institution responsible for forging 
the Single European Market and ensuring the “four freedoms,” meaning movement of 
goods, services, capital, and people. Third, the changing international context must be 
analyzed, in particular, the ways in which FDI from emerging markets has challenged 
the status quo of the traditional investment climate, as well as the unfolding financial 
crisis and economic recession. In this light, this chapter argues that the EU remains one 
of the most open locations for investment in international comparative terms. As 
elsewhere, this openness is far from complete, and multiple barriers to investment 
continue to exist. Much of the controversy around FDI in European circles, in the recent 
period, has crystallized around the notion of IFDI as a potential threat to “strategic 
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industries.” Since the 1990s in particular, the EU has been engaged in an advanced 
process of market integration, which involves the liberalization, deregulation and 
privatization of many former publicly-owned monopolies in sectors such as energy, 
communications, transportation, water and sanitation, and multiple social services, as 
well as banking and financial services. It is these reforms which, implemented in many 
countries around the world, have generated a huge increase in FDI flows to these 
service industries (UNCTAD 2004). In addition, though there was massive privatization 
and liberalization of industrial sectors from the 1980s, some governments retained 
partial control over “national champions,” enterprises that were historically associated 
with the nation and also regarded as “strategic.” As integration advances, pressure from 
the Commission increases to liberalize these national “crown jewels.” However, there is 
suspicion at the national level that open FDI regimes may mean foreign takeovers of 
these “strategic” national assets, many of which were used for decades to satisfy 
political economy and welfare demands. In this regard, there is legal grey area between 
the Commission, responsible for liberalizing markets, and national governments, 
responsible, in the last resort, for defining and guaranteeing national security. The 
coming of age of emerging market MNEs (Goldstein 2007) coincides with these internal 
tensions. There have been several highly publicized cases in which potential M&As, 
originating in emerging markets, have been blocked in the EU, some of which are 
discussed in this chapter. However, there have also been multiple cases where potential 
M&As by other EU member States were blocked, so IFDI restrictions are,  by no 
means, applicable only to non-EU investors.  
 
With the aim of evaluating how ready the EU is for FDI from emerging markets in a 
fast-changing environment, the remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, 
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the EU IFDI regime is put in international context, to demonstrate that it is still one of 
the most open regimes in the world, though its openness is uneven, since certain 
member States offer greater protection for IFDI into particular sectors than into others. 
Second, the evolution of recent policy reform that directly or indirectly impinges on 
IFDI is analyzed, and the role of the Commission, as “neutralizer” of potential or real 
restrictive attitudes toward IFDI at the national level, is considered. Thirdly, a number 
of recent cases studies on frustrated M&As are discussed, with a view to understanding 
what is at issue in the protection of “strategic” industries in the EU. The conclusions 
follow.  
 
 
17.1  THE CHANGING EU FDI REGIME IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
CONTEXT 
 
When comparing the openness of the EU FDI regime at the international level using 
OECD (2007) methodology, it is apparent that the EU can be classified, on average, as 
being one of the most open regimes in the world, comparable to the U.S., and more 
open than Australia, Canada, Mexico, and New Zealand (Figure 17.1). The EU is also 
much more open than most emerging markets: of the BRICs countries (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China), Brazil is the most open, which helps to explain why OFDI from the EU is 
largely concentrated there. That said, openness is uneven, since there are important 
differences in the extent to which individual member States protect diverse sectors. 
Generally speaking, the most open regimes are the United Kingdom (UK), Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, and Italy, while Finland and Spain pose the greatest 
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restrictions. As regards sectoral openness, manufacturing is generally much more open 
than utilities and services in the EU (OECD 2007, 140).  
 
Most of the tension in the EU over IFDI revolves around a concern to protect “strategic” 
industries, which are defined differently at the national level (Schulz 2008). While, 
traditionally, much concern was focused on military-related sectors, of late, increased 
attention is being placed on infrastructure, such as energy, communications, 
transportation, and water, as well as on financial and banking sectors. Though the EU is 
as open as the U.S., in general, both its electricity and telecommunications sectors are 
more protected than their U.S. counterparts. It has to be remembered that, historically, 
these sectors, along with other network industries, were organized as state-owned 
monopolies for most of the twentieth century, managed according to particular social 
welfare principles and heavily unionized. Even at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, they are still broadly perceived as being “public services,” associated with the 
welfare state requiring special regulation. Beyond this, the telecommunication industry 
is, however, much more open to IFDI than the electricity industry. Explanations can be 
found in geopolitics or political economy. In particular, the smaller EU member States 
located close to Russia’s borders have put in place the greatest restrictions on IFDI in 
electricity. These countries are concerned about the foreign takeover of their energy 
industries, a concern exacerbated by their small size or their Russian neighbor (Klinova 
2007). France, however, also maintains above average protection of its electricity 
industry, which has a political economy explanation. The most liberal electricity 
regimes are found in Belgium and Spain (which has historically had regionally-based 
companies, with limited competition, and significant private sector involvement) and 
the U.K. (which implemented market-oriented reforms early on). In contrast, the 
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telecommunication sector in the EU, which is often described as a “strategic” sector in 
many countries, is on average as open to IFDI as any other industry sector in the EU.1  
 
Figure 17.1 FDI “openness” in general, fixed telephony and electricity, 1998-2000 
 
Source: Data on openness to FDI by sector is measured according to the methodology provided in Golub 
(2003) and Koyama et al. (2006). The FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index represents as “0” full 
openness and “1” a prohibition of FDI. “Restrictiveness” is calculated at the industry level and then a 
weighted OECD average is obtained using the weights, based on the sectoral composition of overall FDI 
and trade flows of OECD countries.  
 
In terms of the direction of recent IFDI flows into EU member States, almost two thirds 
were intra-EU flows, though in some countries, such as France, Germany, Spain, 
Poland, Luxembourg, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, this ratio was even higher 
(Table 17.1). IFDI from emerging markets has grown rapidly in recent years, even if it 
remains marginal in volume terms. The BRIC countries account for the larger part of 
these IFDI flows, which represented 0.7% of total IFDI into the EU. Brazil and Russia 
                                                 
1 However, there are above-average levels of protectionism in Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Spain. In the 
case of Spain, the telecommunication sector was organized as a private monopoly, and its main players 
treated as “national champions.” 
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each account for 0.3%. While Russian inflows have been mainly directed toward 
Austria, Poland and Germany, Brazilian inflows have focused on Hungary.2 
 
Table 17.1 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elaborated by authors based on UNCTAD (2008). 
 
As regards the M&A track record, the EU regime is also relatively open when compared 
internationally. The entry of MNEs from emerging markets into both northern and 
southern markets has increasingly attracted the attention of scholars.3 In recent years, 
dozens of MNEs from emerging markets have entered the EU, including Tata, Mittal, 
Nanjing, Marcopolo, Cemex, Weg, Orascom, Lukoil, Gazprom, PEMEX, Hyundai, 
Sungwoo, Samsung, Sabó, Sonatrach, Orascom, and Grupo Bimbo, to mention only a 
few, sometimes taking over flagship European firms (See, for example, Antkiewicz and 
Whalley 2006; El País 2007; Lapper and Wheatley 2008.) Of course, a considerable 
number of the attempts by MNEs from emerging markets to enter the European energy 
and telecommunications infrastructure have been frustrated, such as recent failures 
experienced by Russia’s Gazprom and Mexico’s Grupo Carso. However, just as 
                                                 
2 This is largely due to the investment of Sabó, a car component manufacturer, founded by a Hungarian 
immigrant in the 1950s, and a global supplier to Volkswagen.  
3  See, for instance: Amsden 2001; International Finance Corporation 2006; Goldstein 2007; Lall 1983; 
Ramamurti and Singh 2008; Sauvant 2008; and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
2006.   
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emerging market MNEs have been frustrated, so have many MNEs based within the 
EU. To illustrate this briefly: Catalan’s Gas Natural and German’s E.On energy firms 
were frustrated in their attempts to take over Spanish Endesa; in 2006, Spanish Abertis 
was blocked when it tried to merge with Italian Autostrade, even though the 
Commission later ruled that Italy had violated EU law. While it is possible to catalogue 
a list of M&A failures and success stories, it is difficult to draw clear and definitive 
conclusions about how ready the EU is for emerging market MNEs, since patterns of 
declared and revealed preferences are not always coherent (Goldstein 2006). One way 
to evaluate better the current climate for IFDI in the EU, especially from emerging 
markets, is to follow the evolution of policy – which, directly or indirectly, affects the 
FDI regime of the EU and its member States. We do this in the next section.  
 
 
17.2 FDI POLICY IN THE EU: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS  
 
Because of its “multilevel” governance structure, the EU offers an interesting arena for 
the analysis of FDI policy. With different remits and objectives, policy developments in 
the Commission, and at the national level, do not necessarily move in the same 
direction. The EU’s liberal FDI regime, both with regard to other EU States and third 
parties, can be traced back to the Treaty of Rome (1957), in which the “four freedoms” 
were outlined: free circulation of goods, services people, and capital, as well as the right 
of establishment. However, implementation of the four freedoms, in the first decades of 
the EU, was irregular and uneven. Though the main beneficiaries in these processes 
were member States, increased liberalization at the international level occurred as a 
“spill-over effect”: as non-member State capital entered the EU, it became increasingly 
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difficult to discriminate against these capital flows. The Commission is, therefore, 
legally responsible for overseeing member States´ application of Treaty law with 
regards to the free movement of capital.4 The freedom of capital movement also applies 
to third countries, though Articles 57, 59 and 60 of the Treaty allow for specific 
exceptions, sanctions and safeguard measures. The Commission also establishes and 
supervises European law regarding cartels, anti-trust, mergers, state aid, and takeovers. 
All of these rules must be implemented by national governments, and failure to do so 
can result in infringement cases brought against individual governments.5 One of the 
Treaty of Lisbon’s aims is to increase the Commission’s competence in investment 
policy, and this development is still ongoing. 
 
In contrast, the FDI regime of each Member State is decided at the national level and is 
usually implemented via bilateral agreements. It addition, it falls to individual 
governments to protect citizens by guaranteeing national security and welfare. This 
“multi-layered” governance can generate tensions. To illustrate this, it is, for instance, 
the national government that defines those industries deemed to be of “strategic” 
importance, as well as the degree of protection from IFDI that those industries would 
enjoy. The Commission, on the other hand, has to ensure liberalized markets, unless this 
would threaten national security. In practice, this is a grey area in legal and political 
terms. There are many recent examples that illustrate this point. Perhaps most 
dramatically, the terrorist attacks that have occurred since September 11, 2001, have 
                                                 
4 As a general rule, and according to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, policy should be, 
by “default”, conducted at the national level, with European-level policy only occurring when the EU 
enjoys legal competence to act, and where subsidiarity and proportionality are respected. 
5 An ongoing list of infringement cases is available at: 
  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/capital/analysis/index_en.htm 
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had infrastructure as their central target, and have often used infrastructure services to 
orchestrate attacks.6 Debate has been renewed on how “critical infrastructure” can be 
protected, including aspects of its ownership and regulation. For many Europeans, the 
cold month of January 2009 was accompanied by the threat or actual lack of gas, the 
result of a stand-off between Russia and Ukraine, discussed in the third section.  
Certainly, if there is a blackout, an energy or water failure, or paralysis of the urban 
transportation system, European citizens hold their national government accountable, 
regardless of who owns and runs the network (Clifton et al. 2007; Costas 2007). The 
same perception characterizes the current financial crisis: national governments are held 
accountable by their citizens. There is some evidence that this belief in national 
accountability is getting stronger: according to special Eurobarometer surveys 
regarding energy issues, in 2006, 57% of Europeans stated that energy challenges 
should be managed at the local or national level, and not at the European level, up from 
45% in 2005 (European Commission 2006). Unsurprisingly, this change was 
particularly strong in countries near the Russian border (Estonia, Latvia), near Ukraine 
(Romania, Hungary), as well as in smaller countries, such as Austria, Cyprus, Greece, 
and Ireland.  
 
Another reason for the tensions between member States and the Commission is the need 
for the former to satisfy political economy interests. A number have opted to protect 
business in certain industries, using “national champion” policies. In particular, former 
monopoly incumbents in energy, water and communications have enjoyed a temporary 
                                                 
6 Mobile telephony has been used to organize the logistics of the attacks as well as to time bomb 
explosions; public infrastructure (trains, metros, buses, and airplanes) have been specifically targeted for 
explosions; commercial airplanes were used as weapons of mass destruction and the postal system was 
used for sending dangerous substances.  
584 
 
“respite” from European liberalization directives, by delaying opening up at home while 
aggressively pursuing expansion opportunities abroad. For instance, with virtual 
monopoly privileges at home, the Spanish MNE Telefonica expanded early into the 
Latin American telecommunications markets, which were privatized from the early 
1990s onwards, following the region’s debt crisis. EDF, Telecom Italia, Deutsche 
Telekom, and Suez are just some of the enterprises who have used “asymmetrical” 
behavior to emerge as MNE world-players (Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes 2008). 
 
17.2.1 Recent Trends in Policies and Practices Affecting FDI 
 
Since the current financial crisis spread to most other areas of economic life there have 
been many threats and declarations by governments and trade unions from various EU 
countries over the need to purchase nationally-produced goods. In the U.K., strikes have 
taken place to protest firms’ hiring of non-national (Italian) workers. Protectionism, it 
would seem, could spiral out of control if left unchecked. At the same time, most of 
these threats have been countered by reminders as to the cause of the Great Depression 
and the futility of isolation. Declared and revealed preferences are often contradictory, 
however. This section focuses on the way in which the EU, following global patterns, 
has implemented an increased number of policies and practices that have negatively 
affected IFDI in the past few years.  
 
The most common, formal instruments to restrict FDI are ownership restrictions, 
obligatory screening and approval procedures and other formal restrictions, such as 
rules on the composition of the board, restrictions on the employment of foreign 
nationals and so on. All of these instruments have been used by one EU member State 
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or another in recent years. There are, of course, numerous other policies that do not 
necessarily focus directly on IFDI, but work in other ways to restrict it. These 
mechanisms may be more subtle, such as the existence of complex regulatory 
frameworks or systems of corporate control. In addition, informal practices, such as the 
publication of opinions by policy-makers or members of the business community in 
order to steer an “unfriendly” investment climate, are also likely to affect the climate for 
IFDI. An evaluation of the importance of these formal and informal instruments on FDI 
must be made carefully. Just as the World Trade Organization (WTO) prefers 
“transparent” tariffs to other forms of protectionism, since they are easier to quantify 
and, therefore, compare, formal instruments relating to FDI, such as laws, regulations 
and screening mechanisms, are easier to quantify than their informal counterparts. 
However, even though an analysis of formal FDI rules provides a useful - if 
impressionistic - picture of an economy’s position vis-à-vis IFDI, of greater importance 
is the use made of the FDI framework. For instance, there have been some important 
cases of restricting FDI in EU member States using existing FDI regulations. To 
complicate matters further, it is not always easy to know the facts about why one deal is 
blocked and another accepted, and the real role of IFDI restrictions in the process. With 
these caveats in mind, this section analyzes policy responses, first by member States and 
then by the Commission. Two main areas are covered: the policy responses based on 
concerns about security, however defined, and EU member States’ responses to the rise 
of SWFs.  
 
At the individual member State level, Germany has perhaps gone furthest in the 
introduction of new policies that restrict IFDI. In September 2008, the German Cabinet 
approved a new bill that will allow prospective IFDI, involving 25% or more of a 
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company’s stake by non-European firms, to be screened for approval. According to 
German officials, one of the triggers for this reform was in 2003, when a U.S. private 
equity investment firm acquired a German submarine manufacturer (Government 
Accountability Office 2008, 61). Alarm was raised about the lack of legal clarity in the 
protection of German military and strategic interests and, the following year, section 
seven of the German Foreign Trade and Payments Act was enacted, which established 
limits to the free movement of capital into Germany on the grounds of “security.” IFDI 
would be subject to review if it involved acquisition of a domestic company producing 
or developing weapons or other military equipment. German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
claimed that Germany needed a “light CFIUS” (Benoit 2008) and, while the German 
government has downplayed the importance of this new bill, many local businesses 
have expressed concern over the negative signals that this may send to international 
markets. The stated concern behind this bill was the need to clarify German law in order 
to ensure “strategic” industries were protected, and officials stress that Germany is only 
adapting its policy framework to the U.S. or U.K. model. As shown in Table 17.1, 
Germany is relatively more exposed to Russian IFDI than most other EU member 
States, which could partly explain their concerns. In addition, as seen in Figure 17.1, 
Germany has been more open to IFDI in the electricity and telecommunication 
industries than are EU member States on average. This confirms the understanding that 
the new bill could be interpreted as a move away from relative openness toward the EU 
average, though it remains to be seen how the Commission will respond. This is already 
the second version of the bill, the first version was rejected by the Commission (Walker 
2008).7  
                                                 
7 Also in September 2008, the Commission handed the German government a “final warning” on  the so-
called “VW law,” which was found in 2007 to violate EU rules on the free flow of capital. This law 
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France has also attracted much attention for its recent IFDI reforms. Facing the prospect 
of a hostile takeover of Danone, a food company, then Prime Minister Dominique de 
Villepin celebrated “patriotisme économique” (Le Monde 2005). In 2005, the French 
government compiled a list of “strategic” and “sensitive” industries in which foreign 
investors would be subject to government screening (UNCTAD 2006; OECD 2007).8 
The Decree (2005-1739) was criticized by the Commission, which stated that it did not 
respect the principle of “proportionality,” was unnecessarily unfavorable to IFDI, 
included “casinos” (which were already protected by another French law), and 
discriminated between EU and non-EU investors, since potential investors from non-EU 
countries would be required to provide more data to the review process board. In the 
face of criticism, the French Government appealed to the principle of subsidiarity, and 
claimed that it has the ultimate duty to defend the “national interest,” as well as the legal 
responsibility to define what constitutes a “strategic” industry. The Commission 
formally requested France to modify the Decree in October 2006, and discussions were 
still ongoing throughout 2008. At the same time, in French policy circles, concerns have 
grown over the security of the country’s energy infrastructure and supply. Since 
winning the presidential elections in 2007, President Sarkozy has publicly declared his 
preference for an active industrial policy approach. In June 2007, inspired by 
                                                                                                                                               
prevents the car company from being taken over as the Lower Saxony state government owns 20% of 
Volkswagen (Schäfer 2008). 
8 The Decree protects: gambling and casinos, private security, research and development in substances of 
potential interest to terrorists, equipment designed to intercept communication, testing of information 
technology systems, products for information systems security, cryptology equipment, activities carried 
out by firms entrusted with defence secrets, research or production of arms or war materials, and activities 
carried out by firms for the design or supply of equipment for the Ministry of Defence. 
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developments in Germany, the French Parliament produced a report suggesting that the 
energy sector should be added to the list of protected industries. This debate has been 
“uploaded” to the European level, as we shall see later in this section. Finally, with the 
onset of recession in 2008 and, in response to a concern that distressed assets in the EU 
could be bought up cheaply by foreigners, Sarkozy proposed the creation of a European 
SWF, in order to protect Europe’s “strategic” industries, though nothing has come of 
this initiative to date. Appealing to populist sentiment, Sarkozy was quoted as saying “I 
don’t want European citizens to wake up in several months time and find that European 
companies belong to non-European capital, which bought at the share prices’ lowest 
point” (International Herald Tribune 2008). 
 
There are several other developments at the national level. Hungary has earned the 
disapproval of the Commission, which issued a formal letter of concern to its 
Government over its new company law on FDI, passed in 2007. The Commission 
perceives this law as incompatible with European law. While Hungarian authorities 
claim this law aims to secure the public supply of services such as energy and water, the 
Commission argues that it has two main and undesirable effects: firstly, the Hungarian 
government will have the right to place politicians on the boards of energy firms; and 
secondly, that it will slow down and publicize potential M&As, which could eliminate 
the element of surprise, thus increasing prices, and opening up further opportunities to 
block operations (European Commission 2007).9 In 2006, Hungary was also asked by 
the Commission to modify its privatization law, which, the Commission claimed, 
                                                 
9 Ongoing developments in the completion of the Single Market are found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/capital/analysis/index_en.htm.  
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confers golden shares to firms in industries including food, pharmaceuticals, financial 
services, telecommunications, energy, and defense.  
 
The retention of “golden shares” in privatized industries has been an area in which the 
EU has been active vis-à-vis national governments. Infringement procedures have been 
initiated with regards to various countries, but firms, and the Commission, state that 
special rights are still conferred on privileged investors, preventing capital from flowing 
freely. In January 2008, the Commission referred Portugal to the European Court of 
Justice over its alleged special rights in Portugal Telecom (European Commission 
2008a) and Energias de Portugal (European Commission 2008b), while in July 2008, 
the European Court of Justice found the requirement that potential acquisitions of 
Spanish energy firms had to be approved by the National Energy Commission to violate 
Community law (European Commission 2008c).  
 
Member States’ behavior has thus been subject to review by the Commission in the 
areas in which it has competence. In general, the Commission functions as the 
“liberalizing machine,” correcting national economic policies if they violate the free 
movement of capital. Two important developments, however, have emerged at the 
supranational level which concern – directly or indirectly – IFDI flows: energy policy 
and responses to SWFs.  
 
European energy policy can be traced back to the Treaty of Rome (1957), particularly 
with regard to the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty and the Euratom Treaty 
on civil use of nuclear energy. However, until the 1990s, little was done to forge an 
internal market in energy and other infrastructure, and providers were usually organized 
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as national or local state-owned monopolies. From the late 1990s onwards, market-
oriented reforms began, particularly in telecommunications, electricity and gas. Though 
belated, these reforms caused great expectations and, between 1993 and 2000, the 
world-wide race for FDI was dominated by investment in telecommunications and 
energy utilities. Nearly two-thirds of world FDI during this period took place within the 
EU, and the utilities industries were responsible for nearly three-quarters of 
privatization proceeds (Clifton et al. 2003). As world FDI flows dropped by 
approximately half between 2000 and 2003, in the EU, delays dogged the 
implementation of European liberalization directives on electricity and gas, while the 
reforms already implemented did not always deliver what had been promised, in terms 
of competition, price reductions and market power. A second round of reforms was 
launched in 2003 (European Directives on Electricity 2003/54/EC and Gas 2003/55/EC) 
with the stated aims of providing more competition (highest priority), improving service 
quality and universal services and ensuring the security of supply. Despite the rhetoric, 
the main focus of the Commission was economically-driven: market competition was 
sought above all, at the expense of the other two objectives. One year later, the 
Commission found that eighteen member States had not implemented the new directives 
adequately. In 2005, the Commission took Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, and 
Spain to court for failing to adapt national laws to the directives. The following year, the 
Commission took action against seventeen countries for failing to implement 
legislation. After several years of attempted reform, the largest generator in the 
electricity market in EU member States often enjoys huge market shares. Stephen 
Thomas (2003) predicted that these liberalization reforms would lead to monopolistic 
competition between the “seven brothers,” though there were arguably only five or six 
by 2009. While some member States liberalized quite deeply (U.K., Spain, Belgium), 
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other member States were much more reluctant. Some electricity firms aggressively 
exploited opportunities presented by liberalization programs abroad, while they enjoyed 
restricted or delayed liberalization at home (Table 17.2). Smaller economies, 
particularly those bordering Russia, avoided M&As in their electricity markets based on 
“security” concerns. Many governments and their firms were simply flouting European 
legislation in terms of unbundling and liberalization. In 2006, a further Directive 
(2005/89/EC) was passed concerning measures to safeguard the security of the 
electricity supply and infrastructure investment. 
 
In 2007, the new energy policy was launched by the EU, which includes issues beyond 
purely economically-driven concerns, such as increased attention to the promotion of 
new or diverse energy sources, climate change and the coordination of energy “security 
of supply.” Security of supply is understood as an emphasis on diversity of energy types 
and sources, dialogue and agreements with trading partners, and preparation for an 
energy crisis (European Council 2006). In the face of maverick firms and member 
States delaying or refusing to unbundle, the Commission has relaxed its policy stance 
somewhat, opting for “competition for the market” rather than “competition in the 
market”. Some European politicians claim that Russia’s decision to cut off energy 
supplies to Ukraine, in 2006, triggered this shift in European energy policy. One 
development is that the Commission is seeking to impose a “reciprocity” clause 
(sometimes called the “Gazprom clause”) so that companies buying EU energy 
transmission assets would have to abide by similar rules to those of the EU as regards 
liberalizing markets. A further clause stipulates that “third-country individuals and 
countries cannot acquire control over a Community transmission system or transmission 
system operator, unless this is permitted by an agreement between the EU and the third 
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country.” The clause, once adopted as law, would remove national competence in the 
area and require that any bilateral energy agreements with third countries are dealt with 
exclusively at the Community level. The current Energy Commissioner, Andris 
Piebalgs, justified the reciprocity clause on the grounds that it would give third-country 
suppliers “clear rules” for investment in the European market (Euractiv 2007; Wolf 
2007). Discussions are ongoing and the Council adopted the development as part of the 
internal energy market package in February 2009.  
 
Table 17.2  Market share of the largest generator in the electricity market of each 
country, 1999-2001, 2004-2006 
Country 1999-2001 2004-2006 Change 
United Kingdom 21.5 20.9 -0.6 
Finland 24.1 24.0 -0.1 
Germany 30.4 28.4 -2.0 
Spain 46.0 34.0 -12.0 
Italy 54.3 38.9 -15.4 
Sweden 50.3 46.3 -4.0 
Ireland 96.9 68.4 -28.5 
Portugal 59.3 54.5 -4.8 
Denmark 37.3 41.0 3.7 
Belgium 92.0 85.9 -6.1 
France 91.3 89.3 -2.0 
Greece 97.7 96.2 -1.5 
Poland 20.0 18.1 -1.9 
Hungary 39.9 38.6 -1.3 
Slovenia 50.7 51.5 0.8 
Lithuania 74.5 72.9 -1.6 
Slovakia 84.4 79.1 -5.3 
Czech Republic 70.0 72.9 2.9 
Estonia 91.3 92.0 0.7 
Latvia 95.8 92.9 -2.9 
 
Source: Elaborated by authors based on EUROSTAT (2008). 
 
 
The second area where significant developments have occurred is with regards to 
SWFs. Already controversial before the current financial crisis and recession, falling 
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asset values in the EU have made this topic even more contentious. The main thrust of 
the development has been to work on guidelines for both the recipient country and the 
agent behind the fund in order to increase the transparency and predictability of this 
type of investment. Here, the ongoing work of the OECD (2009) has been helpful for 
EU policy-makers in drawing up key principles and a common EU code was drafted at 
the end of 2008 (European Commission 2008d).  
 
Thus, the Commission has been active in reversing “golden shares,” rejecting or 
diluting national government’s lists of “strategic industries” and enforcing the free 
movement of capital, both within the EU and with regards to third countries. Yet, there 
remains a grey area between market liberalization, on the one hand, and nationally 
defined “security interests,” on the other, into which the majority of disputes fall. 
Moreover, there are delays in the liberalization process of some industries, such as 
energy, where, for instance, unbundling policies will not be easy to enforce.  
 
 
17.3 FDI AND EUROPE’S “STRATEGIC” INDUSTRIES 
 
There have been several highly publicized, controversial cases recently, in which 
attempts by investors to enter EU energy, and other infrastructure markets have failed. 
This section selects two cases for in-depth analysis with a view to understanding the 
central issues and informal dynamics around FDI in “strategic” industries. The first case 
analyzes what is probably the most controversial instance of IFDI from an emerging 
market: Gazprom, making explicit the concerns over this MNE from an EU perspective. 
The second case discusses the controversy around the so-called “Endesa saga.” Here, 
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three levels of protectionism can be seen: firstly, a leading emerging market MNE, 
América Móvil of the Grupo Carso, was frustrated in its efforts to enter the EU; 
secondly, protectionism among members of the EU; and thirdly, protectionism at the 
national level, and between rival political-economic groups.  
 
17.3.1 Gazprom 
 
No other global player from an emerging market has aroused as much controversy in the 
EU as Gazprom. Though the vast majority of Russian MNEs are privately owned, 
Gazprom constitutes an important exception. The overriding concern in the EU is that 
its business may be politically motivated. As Åslund (2006, 1) notes, “the fundamental 
question is to what extent [Gazprom] represents the state and business interests, 
respectively,” while, according to the OECD (2002, 106), “it can at times be difficult 
even to identify where the state budget ends and Gazprom’s begins.” The Financial 
Times (2008) on the other hand harbors no such doubts: “all decisions are taken in the 
Kremlin. Both psychologically and practically, Gazprom is not a commercial 
enterprise.”   
 
Strong ties have bound Gazprom and the Russian state since 1993, when the company 
was formed out of the Russian part of the Ministry of Gas Industry, by the last Soviet 
Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin (who would become Prime Minister of Russia under 
Yeltsin in 1992-98). Its governance remained opaque and, in the early 2000s, under 
pressure from international investors,10 the new president Vladimir Putin removed 
                                                 
10 In the mid-1990s, a large minority share of Gazprom was privatized to managers and employees, but  
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Gazprom management and appointed a duo of trusted advisors. Other sources of power 
consist of KGB staff from St. Petersburg and old Gazprom hands. For Putin, who took a 
very active interest in management issues and relied on Gazprom to solidify his broad 
popular support, this split into three groups resulted in great leeway to balance them 
(Åslund 2006).  
 
Under Dmitry Medvedev, who was also head of the presidential administration, and 
CEO Alexei Miller, who had worked with Putin in the mayor’s office in St. Petersburg, 
Gazprom has gained in assertiveness, and completed its ascendancy as Russia’s pre-
eminent economic institution and a central player in domestic politics.11 Gazprom – in 
which the government controls 50.002% of shares through the Russian Federal Agency 
for Federal Property Management (Rosimushchestvo), Rosneftegaz, and 
Rosgazifikatsiya – generates 8% of national tax revenue and employs over 430.000 staff 
(Economist 2005). The main objective of the new management has been to boost its 
                                                                                                                                               
 share sales were restricted. As a result, a considerable price differentiation evolved between domestic, 
restricted shares, and the few internationally tradable shares. Another consequence was that all Gazprom 
shares were extremely cheap in relation to the purported asset values. Managers were shifting corporate 
assets to entities controlled by friends and relatives. In late 2000, journalists at The Wall Street Journal, 
the Financial Times and Business Week began to write stories about corporate governance problems at 
Gazprom, based on research by Bill Browder, manager of The Hermitage Fund, a hedge fund focused on 
Russian investments. Eventually the CEO was fired and corporate reforms were enacted. Since late 2006, 
Browder has been impeded from entering Russia. Corporate governance problems resurfaced again in 
connection with the true nature of RosUkrEnergo, the secretive energy trader which dominates gas 
supplies from Central Asia to Europe. See Financial Times (2006). 
11 In the run-up to the 2008 elections, there were rumours that Putin might succeed Medvedev as 
Gazprom chairperson. As it turned out, Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov took over while Putin became 
Prime Minister. 
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stock price, which has increased more than ten-fold in the past three years. Although 
Gazprom is one of the world’s most valuable companies, it also had one of the lowest 
returns on assets in the energy sector (Ostrovsky 2006). 
 
Initially, the new management focused on recovering assets that had been sold off 
cheaply to other companies, when not “lost.” Another important step was to 
homogenize its prices of natural gas on the Russian border. While Gazprom’s Western 
European customers paid negotiated market prices (which include large transportation 
costs in pipelines and substantial taxes), former Soviet republics paid highly 
differentiated prices.12 This offensive has led to a number of incidents, including with 
allies such as Belarus. The struggle between Russia and Ukraine, and to a lesser extent 
Moldova, during the last week of 2005 and the beginning of 2006, renewed anxieties 
regarding European gas import dependence.13 Problems reoccurred in February 2008, 
                                                 
12 In Russia's WTO accession negotiations, some WTO members, among them Europe, argued that dual 
pricing acted as a trade barrier by providing unfair advantages to Russian energy-intensive companies 
and, therefore, that gas prices should be unified. Spanier (2007) argued that the perceived advantages of 
unified Russian gas pricing to Russia, as well as Europe, are, in fact, overstated and that EU security of 
supply might worsen under unified gas prices. 
13 On New Year’s Day, following a disagreement concerning subsidized gas prices paid by Ukraine for 
Russian gas, Gazprom decided to reduce gas supply to this country. The Ukrainian pipeline system, 
however, is pivotal in supplying gas to the EU and as a consequence, the EU gas supply was affected: 
from January 1–3, Gazprom’s gas supply to France decreased by 25–30%; supply to Austria decreased by 
33%; and Italy received approximately 25% less gas than normal. Dependency on Russian supply of 
natural gas among large EU economies is spread between roughly one-quarter in France (where gas 
accounts for a relatively small share of the energy mix) and Italy to almost one-half in Germany and more 
than that in Poland. Across Europe, import dependence is expected to grow from roughly 50% today to 
more than 80%. 
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when Gazprom again threatened to reduce gas supplies to Ukraine to force repayment of 
what it claims is a debt of a US$1.5 billion. Yet again, in the coldest days of the year, in 
January 2009, Gazprom cut off its gas supply to Ukraine over price disputes, though 
Gazprom firmly blamed Ukraine for closing down the export pipelines. Despite the 
claims and counterclaims, thousands of European citizens were denied basic access to 
gas provision.  
 
The major grievance expressed by the EU (and by the U.S.) is that politics played a 
major role in these dramas. It is fair to say that Gazprom’s strategy of raising prices 
relatively quickly makes business sense in the current energy market environment. The 
next key task is to raise the domestic Russian gas price. In fact a partial deregulation of 
the domestic gas market is also in the interest of the Unified Energy System, which 
despairs at the shortage of gas in Russia. At present, the pre-tax wholesale price for gas 
is around US$42 per thousand cubic meters (mcm).14  
 
Gazprom’s strategy has been to use excess profits to acquire downstream assets, mainly 
access to distribution networks, in a bid to reach the final consumer. Whether through 
debt-for-share agreements, or upstream–downstream swaps (UDS), Gazprom has been 
quite successful in solidifying its presence in the EU. It is particularly active in Eastern 
Europe (in Bulgaria, for instance, its 50% joint venture with Overgas, a Bulgarian-
Russian company, has twenty-seven urban distribution licenses, including in Sofia) but 
                                                 
14 In the context of Russia’s WTO accession, the EU signed its bilateral protocol in May 2004. The 
conflict over domestic price of natural gas (of particular relevance to producers of mineral fertilizers) was 
settled on conditions favourable to Russia. Although competitors are now complaining anew that the 
Russian domestic gas price has failed to keep pace with the increases on the world market, Gazprom is 
now worried that the low cost has encouraged wasteful domestic use. 
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also, and increasingly, in the West. In the U.K., for instance, it controls Pennine, the 
largest private-owned gas supplier. There was a mooted (but never-confirmed) intention 
of buying a stake in Centrica, Britain’s largest gas supplier, in 2006 (Williamson 
2006).15 In addition, Gazprom launched a bid to take control of Petroleum Industries of 
Serbia (NIS) at what seemed a bargain price – so much so that many saw this as a quid 
pro quo for Russian support for Serbia over Kosovo. Elsewhere, Gazprom has 
announced multi-billion exploration and production investment projects in Bolivia and 
Nigeria – both difficult countries where Western investors were, until recently, 
dominant (MacDonald 2008; Schipani 2008). 
  
Meanwhile, Gazprom has invested little in the development of new major gas finds. 
New prospects, such as the Yamal peninsula and the offshore Shtokman field, are years 
from coming on stream. European gas demand will rise from presently 540 billion cubic 
meters (bcm) to around 800 bcm in 2030. Thus, a potential supply gap is appearing that 
may take time and money to close (Goldthau 2008; Mandil 2006). While Åslund (2006) 
argued that Gazprom does not invest more because the domestic gas price is still too 
low to cover the associated costs, other analysts claim that management is concentrating 
its efforts in protecting its monopoly position. Gazprom has acquired various assets 
within Russia quite cheaply because of its combination of monopoly power over 
pipelines, pricing, exports, and state regulation. Small independent gas producers have 
been squeezed out and forced to sell their assets cheaply to Gazprom, which, in 2005 
also bought Sibneft and became Russia’s fifth-largest oil producer. In the Sakhalin II 
project, the Kremlin exercised pressure on Shell Royal Dutch until the company agreed 
                                                 
15 The Financial Times, which originally carried the story of British opposition to any Gazprom takeover 
of Centrica, later backtracked. 
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to renegotiate its product-sharing agreement and to give a large share of its investment 
to Gazprom. TNK-BP, half-owned by BP, is currently going through similar difficulties, 
arguably in order for Gazprom to acquire eventually a stake in the giant Kovykta gas 
field in East Siberia. Gazprom’s long-term industrial strategy is to produce more coal 
and increase its use in electricity generating and home heating in Russia, freeing more 
gas for export. Gazprom had been buying electricity-generating companies from the 
state electricity company, which is being split up. In February 2008, Gazprom acquired 
control of the Siberian Coal and Energy Company, Russia’s largest coal producer by 
volume.16 The joint venture will retain Siberian’s name but be controlled by Gazprom 
and is expected to become the largest electricity company in Russia by late-2009. 
Gazprom has also diversified into other business such as nuclear power (100% of 
Atomstroïexport) and media (NTV, Izvestia, and Tribuna). 
 
Gazprom is also very active in transmission investments. The bulk of exports currently 
go to Europe, via a pipeline through Ukraine, with the remaining 20% transiting through 
Belarus and Poland. Two approaches are being tried to get around this unsatisfactory 
situation. First, to build the Baltic pipeline (Northstream) directly from Russia to 
Germany through the Baltic Sea, as well as a second one to Italy (Southstream). Second, 
in 2006, Putin decided that Gazprom will build one or two gas pipelines to China, rather 
than invest in a liquefied natural gas plant designed for exports to the U.S.. Gazprom 
has also derided as “unrealistic” the construction of a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline from 
                                                 
16 Russia generates 43% of its electricity from natural gas and 23% from coal. By comparison, in the 
United States, 49% of the electricity is generated from coal, according to the Energy Information 
Administration. Gazprom has a surplus of carbon emissions credits under the terms of the Kyoto Protocol 
because of Russia’s industrial contraction in the 1990s, and thus has spare capacity to burn more coal 
under the agreement, which Moscow signed. See Kramer (2008).  
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Kazakhstan to Turkey and into Europe that could greatly enhance Europe’s energy 
security (Catan 2006).  
 
The EU has so far failed to present a unified position vis-à-vis Gazprom. Germany, for 
instance, has preferred to develop a special energy relationship with Russia, although 
the Merkel government has been more cautious than its predecessor.17 Italy has also 
negotiated the entry of Gazprom into the domestic downstream market in exchange for 
space to its energy giants ENI and ENEL in Russia.18 What is certain is that, to date, 
Russia has, by and large, refused to come to terms with European requests. Moscow has 
consistently refused to sign up to any kind of political agreements, such as the Energy 
Charter Treaty and its Transit Protocol under the EU-Russia Partnership and Co-
operation Agreement.19 The EU now insists on a liberalization of the Russian (and 
European) gas market, free and nondiscriminatory access to pipeline systems 
throughout Europe, including Russia, commitments to uninterrupted supplies, and 
mutually equal conditions for investment in the energy sector.  
 
                                                 
17 BASF, which has a 24.5% stake in the North-European Gas Pipeline Company and whose subsidiary 
Wintershall owns 51% of Wingas, the joint venture with Gazprom that trades Russian gas in Western 
Europe, has gained access rights to the Ioujno-Rousskoe fields. See The Economist (2006). 
18 In addition to the possibility of investing in one of the local utilities, Gazprom would like to buy a stake 
in SNAM, the ENI subsidiary that controls the gas transmission network. See Corriere Economia (2006 
and 2008). 
19 The Energy Charter was negotiated in 1991, before Russia’s new energy interests had been formed. 
The United States and Canada never even signed the charter because of legal concerns, and Norway had 
other legal concerns, so it did not ratify the charter. 
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In summary, Gazprom and the EU are stuck in an imbroglio that is largely explained by 
their mutual dependence (Grigoyev 2008). Eirik Lund Sagen and Marina Tsygankova 
(2008) used both theoretical and numerical tools to study the potential effects of 
different Russian domestic gas prices and production capacities in 2015 on Russian gas 
exports.Their main findings suggest that both increased domestic gas prices and 
sufficient production capacities are vital to maintaining Gazprom’s market share in 
Europe over the next decade. In fact, Russia may struggle to carry out its current long-
term export commitments if domestic prices are sufficiently low. At the same time, if 
Russian prices approach European levels, Gazprom may reduce exports in favor of a 
relatively more profitable domestic market.  
 
The objectives of the EU as importer would be best served by deregulation and 
liberalization, lifting restrictions on foreign or independent investors wishing to gain 
access to Russian reserves and unhindered access to the pipeline infrastructure and 
export markets. At the same time, alternative sources are either more expensive or 
politically unfeasible. In the current political context, it is doubtful whether the Russian 
Federation would consider higher domestic Russian gas prices, enhanced energy 
efficiency and increases in non-Gazprom production as its supreme objectives. 
Gazprom, however, cannot realistically expect to diversify significantly its customer 
base toward China and other Asian countries, or to make any significant progress in 
downstream markets, unless it is ready to give way in its home market. 
 
 
 
 
602 
 
 
17.3.2 Endesa 
 
The Endesa “saga” has been one of the most controversial deals in the EU to date. The 
saga involved Gas Natural (from Catalunya, Spain) and two leading electricity 
incumbents, German E.On and Italian ENEL. The Commission intervened repeatedly, 
making eight “decisions” concerning mergers and the free movement of capital in the 
light of unfolding events. From the 1980s onwards, Endesa transformed itself from a 
local, state-owned enterprise to the world’s fourth largest electricity MNE. From 2006 
onwards, it participated in the generation, transportation and distribution systems in 
France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Portugal, South America, and North Africa. 
Nevertheless, its core activities remained in Spain where it is the largest domestic power 
supplier, providing 45% of power generation and 40% of distribution (Clifton et al. 
2007).  
 
In September 2005, Gas Natural (whose major shareholders were La Caixa of Catalonia 
and Repsol) launched a hostile takeover bid (€22.5 billion) for Endesa. The aim was to 
create a national champion large enough to compete with the other EU firms, such as 
EdF, E.On,20 RWE, and Enel. This bid did not advance as the Spanish and Catalonian 
governments had anticipated, however, due to the managerial opposition of Endesa 
                                                 
20 E.On is the product of the merger of former state-owned enterprises Veba and Viag electricity utilities 
(PreussenElektra and Bayernwerk) in 2000. It is now one of the largest energy MNEs in the world. From the 
outset, E.On had participations in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Russia, and Sweden. Since then, E.On acquired companies in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Germany, 
Romania, Slovakia, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U. S..  E.On is, however, not active in France, Portugal, 
Ireland, or Spain. 
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chairperson, Manuel Pizarro. Party politics played a role: while Pizarro was associated 
with the conservative Partido Popular, La Caixa was associated with the Socialist Party. 
The acquisition of Endesa by La Caixa could create a Socialist economic block, so 
Pizarro sought a “white knight” in the shape of E.On to avoid this: FDI from Germany 
was preferable to national capital representing Catalonian Socialists. 
 
Accordingly, in February 2006, E.On launched a bid to acquire Endesa (€29 billion). 
The Commission approved the bid, not regarding it as one that would impede effective 
competition. The Spanish government, led by President Zapatero and his Socialist party, 
however, objected. Several days later, the government extended the power of the 
electricity and gas regulator (CNE) giving it responsibility to authorize any acquisition 
over 10% (Decree-Law 04/2006). The Commission stepped in, considering this 
restricted the free movement of capital and the right of establishment, as enshrined in 
EU Treaty rules (Articles 56 and 43, respectively).  
 
Though the Spanish government was asked to rectify this legislation, the government 
went further: it introduced additional restrictions in November 2006, when the 
conditions for the takeover were modified, requiring E.On to respect the following 
decisions: 1) Endesa would maintain its brand for a five-year period; 2) the companies 
owning electricity assets outside mainland Spain would be kept within the Endesa 
Group for five years;  3) Endesa’s power plants that used domestic coal would continue 
to use this energy source as foreseen in the national mining plans; and 4) E.On would 
not adopt strategic decisions with regards to Endesa and the security of supply in 
violation of Spanish law. All of these newly imposed conditions were deemed 
incompatible with the EC Treaty’s rules on free movement of capital (Article 56) and on 
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the freedom of establishment (Article 43). The condition about the use of domestic coal 
was also incompatible with the EC Treaty's rules on free movement of goods (Articles 
28). 
A few months later, a third bid to control Endesa was launched, this time by Enel21 and 
Acciona.22 The Commission approved the operation in March 2007. Given the EU 
policy of avoiding market concentration, Enel and E.On agreed that E.On would buy 
most of Enel’s assets in Spain (electricity generation, distribution, supply) including 
Viesgo. In addition, Endesa Europe (including assets in Italy, France, Poland, Portugal 
and Turkey) had to be sold off.  However, Endesa´s market concentration in Latin 
America was reinforced.  
Again, the Commission condemned Spain for the conditions imposed by the Spanish 
regulator on Enel and Acciona in the takeover process, which were, fundamentally, 
similar to those which had been imposed on E.On: 1) to allow Endesa to remain 
independent, including keeping its own brand, and its decision-making center in Spain; 
2) to limit the firm's debt-service ratio; 3) to limit the firm's dividends distribution 
policy; and 4) to ensure certain amounts of national coal were used in Endesa´s 
generation assets 5) to keep the assets of non-mainland electricity systems within the 
                                                 
21 Enel is the main Italian electricity company for generation, distribution and supply of electricity to both 
domestic and industrial users, and is active in Spain, Bulgaria, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Russia, 
France, and the Americas. Enel is also active in the purchase and sale of natural gas for domestic 
electricity generation and gas operations in Italy.  
22 Acciona is a Spanish business corporation, whose main activities are the development and management 
of infrastructure and real estate projects, the provision of transport, urban and environmental services, as 
well as the development and operation of renewable energies. 
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Endesa Group. Not surprisingly, the Commission found these conditions restricted FDI 
and violated the Treaty’s rules on the free movement of capital and the freedom of 
establishment, while the obligation to acquire domestic coal also violated the rules on 
the free movement of goods. 
It is believed that President Zapatero and Prime Minister Prodi came to an agreement 
during February 2007, whereby Enel (in which the Italian State still had 30% 
ownership) would take over Endesa. Interestingly, three weeks after this deal was done, 
Telefónica acquired an indirect 10% stake of Telecom Italia. A few weeks earlier, an 
interest in Telecom Italia had been shown by a consortium comprised of AT&T and 
Mexican MNE América Móvil. América Móvil, a spin-off of Telmex, is one of the 
leading telecommunications MNEs from emerging markets. The potential acquisition of 
Telecom Italia by this consortium raised eyebrows in Italy: Prodi stated that he wished 
Telecom Italia to remain in Italian hands, and called on Italian bankers to make counter 
offers for the shares. The Italian government even threatened regulatory changes that 
would reduce Telecom Italia’s network advantages. Within a few days, AT&T pulled 
out, citing regulatory uncertainty, leaving Carlos Slim’s América Móvil alone in the bid. 
Slim reluctantly withdrew, making room for the acquisition by “archrival” Telefonica, 
along with a consortium of Italian banks (Burnett and Kiefer 2007). Telefonica paid 
40% over the market value to join the winning consortium. Politically, this was a 
winning “European” formula: Prodi obtained his “Italian solution” in exchange for the 
Spanish concession into its energy market. The efforts of the non-EU investors 
including those of Carlos Slim were, however, frustrated. Interestingly, the Italian 
government did not introduce new policies to restrict IFDI, though Prodi made clear that 
Italian capital was his priority. This case does not necessarily indicate there was a clear 
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preference for EU investment, but that business, of mutual interest, between Italy and 
Spain was the priority.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The EU has one of the most liberal FDI regimes in the world, and is increasingly a host 
for IFDI and MNEs from emerging markets. At the same time, the EU is not immune to 
a general increase in concern over IFDI by governments around the world, which has 
been complicated considerably by the financial crisis and economic recession. member 
States have, in recent years, introduced new measures, which aim to restrict IFDI, 
particularly from third countries. Informal practices have also proved unfavorable to 
IFDI. The main justifications given by EU and national policy makers for any increase 
in FDI restrictions revolve around questions of “national security” and “strategic 
industries”. Behind these concerns lies a diverse, contradictory set of interests, including 
bitter experiences with Europe’s dependency on Russia gas, demands of incumbent 
business groups to protect national champions, economic nationalism sentiment and, 
perhaps most importantly, knee-jerk protectionist impulses, based on fears over job 
losses and firm closure in the face of recession. The rise of MNEs from emerging 
markets is a newly emerging issue for EU leaders, and this comes at a difficult time, 
when the Single Market is mature though still blocked in complex sectors. These 
internal tensions are only compounded and intensified as new global players from 
emerging markets strive to enter at a time of financial crisis and economic recession, 
which may render distressed EU assets attractive to international investors. From a 
purely economic point of view, this is to be welcomed, though when the other, wider 
dimensions, such as long-term national interests, are considered, the picture is much less 
607 
 
clear. The leading light in this period of relative darkness is the maturity of institutions 
repeatedly insisting on rational, thought-out collective action, an element missing in the 
1930s. 
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